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Executive Summary
This study investigated whether the type of hospital in which a Medicare
beneficiary is admitted for hip fracture, stroke, coronary heart disease, or
congestive heart failure matters in terms of amount and timing of Medicare
payments and survival. In total, government hospitals were the least expen-
sive for Medicare, with major teaching hospitals being most expensive within
six months of admission after the index event. Survival was best in major
teaching hospitals. When considering payments subsequent to those for
the initial hospitalization, Medicare spent more for patients admitted to for-
profit hospitals than for those admitted to other nonteaching facilities, but
had similar outcomes measured by survival. Payments on behalf of patients
treated in for-profit hospitals were higher for Medicare Part B and home
health, especially during the first two months following discharge from the
initial hospital. Results of our research suggest that Medicare has a definite
financial interest in where Medicare beneficiaries are admitted for their hos-
pital care.
I.Role of Ownership
In principle, the appropriate decision as to ownership rights of the
firm should be based on an arrangement that minimizes the trans-
actions costs between the firm and the various parties with which
it deals, including suppliers of capital funds, input suppliers, and
purchasers of the firm's products. Even in the United States, where
investor-owned firms are clearly the predominant form of organi-
zation, many other ownership forms exist, including employee-
owned enterprises, farmer-owned cooperatives, consumer-owned
electric utilities, occupant-owned condominiums, and mutual insur-
ance companies (Hansmann 1996).
Unlike most other sectors, for-profit organizations constitute a
minority of firms supplying hospital care in the United States and in2 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
1975 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1088 1987 1988 1989 1900 1991 1992 1993 1094 1995 1096
Year
Figure 1.1
Average adjusted daily hospital census in the United States by ownership type, 1975-
1996
all developed countries. In the United States, such hospitals con-
stituted only 15 percent of all nonfederal short-term general hospitals
in 1996 (American Hospital Association 1998). By contrast, 59 percent
of hospitals were organized as private nonprofits, and the rest were
operated by governments, primarily local governments, or special
government authorities.'
Another stylized fact is that growth of for-profit hospitals' market
share has been moderate (figure 1.1), although for-profit chains have
grown both numerically and in influence since they first appeared in
the late 1960s, while the share of small independent for-profit hos-
pitals has declined. Growth in the chain for-profit share has not
been steady, but rather there have been cycles in growth (Gray and
Schlesinger 1997).
Private nonprofit firms differ from their for-profit counterparts in
several respects. In contrast to a stock company, there are no in-
vestors who supply equity in return for a share of any profit that the
firm earns ("residual claimants"). There is an equity market for phil-
anthropic funds, but, in the case of U.S. hospitals, such funds are a
small and decreasing proportion of total capital and operating funds
(Sloan et al. 1990). Charters of nonprofit corporations often contain
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sation is not directly linked to profits earned by the enterprise. In
contrast to a for-profit firm, managers cannot be incentivized with
stock options. Although boards of directors of for-profit firms are at
least nominally elected by equity holders, in the case of nonprofit
enterprises, boards are generally self-perpetuating, that is, selected
by previous boards. Finally, nonprofit organizations enjoy certain tax
advantages, including exemption from property taxes, corporate
income taxes, access to philanthropic funds, which offer exemption
from personal income taxation, and better access to tax exempt debt
finance than for-profit firms. In the case of hospitals, the tax advan-
tages realized by private nonprofits are not substantial. One study
estimated the advantages to be worth about 3 percent of revenue
(Becker and Sloan 1985). Further, tax advantages may be eroding
in various ways. For example, some municipalities charge user fees
for various services such as refuse collection and police and fire
protection.
In general, economists have had a predilection for the for-profit
ownership form. The argument supporting this position, termed
property rights theory, goes as follows. Consider a sole proprietor-
ship, say a laundry. The proprietor values profit, but she or he may
have other values as well. For example, the proprietor may like to
play golf on Thursday afternoons. In deciding to close the shop, the
proprietor weighs the value of the lost profit against the utility gain
from golf. Depending on the relative utility gain, the proprietor
decides whether or not to close the shop. Similarly, the proprietor
may have friends who may not wear clean shirts, and the proprietor
may gain utility from doing the shirts for free. Again, the decision
about whether to provide clean shirts depends on the relative value
of the money to be derived by charging the full amount versus the
"warm glow" to the proprietor from washing the shirts for reduced
or no compensation.
Since there are no equity holders, managers of the nonprofit firms
do not face the same trade-off. In economic jargon, the price of non-
pecuniary benefits is attenuated, that is, this price is reduced. Thus,
the manager buys more nonpecuniary benefits. Such benefits may
take the form of inefficiency, such as avoiding the aggravation of
being a boss, golf (leisure), or donating service.
While in many contexts, preference for the for-profit form may be a
"slam dunk," in the context of hospitals, matters are not so simple.4 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
According to property rights theory, for-profit firms are more effi-
cient. Yet in some communities, hospitals are the major employers,
and citizens appear to value some featherbedding. The community,
and especially members of the hospital medical staff, may enjoy tax
advantages, the former because some taxes to the state and the
federal governmnt are returned to the community. Although these
considerations rriay be viewed as manifestations of market failure,
other forms of behavior may be widely viewed as market perfecting.
For example, reducing the "price" of provision of free care may be
the most efficient mechanism for redistributing care to the uninsured.
Further, given asymmetric information, a profit-seeking hospital may
induce demand for services, especially when the out-of-pocket price
to the buyer is negligible or even zero. With the cash flow to those in
control reduced in the nonprofit form, such behavior may be less
likely. In fact, without much empirical evidence, various critics have
voiced concern that consolidation of hospitals under the aegis of
publicly traded corporations will mean higher-priced and lower-
quality care, and lower rates of production of unprofitable outputs,
including provision of care to persons without health insurance (see,
e.g., Kuttner 1997).
Since the early 1980s, U.S. hospitals, and more recently physicians,
have lost a great deal of their power to set price. This change reflects
changes in government insurance payment practices and growth of
various forms of managed care. As price takers, these firms still have
latitude in selecting patient mix, in the quantities of services used to
treat specific conditions (quality), and in accounting practices that
potentially affect the amounts they are paid. Most recently, it has
been alleged that the largest for-profit hospital firm, Columbia-HCA,
has bilked the Medicare program by billing for services that were not
provided or not needed, and by using various accounting loopholes
to increase payments from Medicare. Also, by aligning itself with
local physicians and other suppliers of services, referral patterns and
cash flows to othr health care providers have changed (increased) as
well.2 This issue is important not only because of the specific allega-
tions made against this firm, but because there is some concern that
this behavior may generalize to other for-profit hospital companies.
For this reason among others, hospital conversions to the for-profit
form are receiving much greater scrutiny by state attorneys' general
and others than heretofore (Singer 1997; Horwitz 1997).Does Where You Are AdmiUed Make a Difference? 5
II.Study Questions and Overview
This study reasks an old question with much better data: how does
hospital ownership affect performance in terms of cost and quality?
We ask, following a sudden, unanticipated adverse health event,
does it matter to which type of hospital a Medicare beneficiary is
taken? In this study, cost is measured by actual Medicare payments,
both for hospital and for nonhospital care. Nonhospital care is rele-
vant because of various vertical arrangements, both explicit and im-
plicit between hospital and nonhospital providers that may vary
systematically by ownership form. For example, at discharge, a pa-
tient may be more likely to be referred to a home health agency if the
hospital has a contractual relationship with such an organization.
Also, physicians sometimes have equity interests in the hospitals to
which they refer patients or are incentivized in other ways less easily
detected by outsiders.
Payments do not directly measure operating efficiency in the sense
of lower laundry cost per unit of output. Yet they do measure the use
of services, conditional on an adverse health event's having occurred.
In addition to analyzing payments, we assess variations in direct
measures of intensity of hospital care by ownership and other fac-
tors. We study outcomes, thus allowing a direct test of differences in
quality by ownership form. Economists and others have long sus-
pected that nonprofit hospitals may buy extra quality with internal
funds generated from profit flows (see, e.g., Newhouse 1970). How-
ever, empirical tests of the quality hypothesis have been limited,
largely for lack of data. In this article, we focus on long-term survival
following an initial admission to a hospital for a health shock. Else-
where, we have reported results on other outcome indicators (Sloan
et al. 1998; Taylor et al. 1998).
For this analysis, we used data on a national sample of almost
2,700 elderly patients who were hospitalized in almost 1,400 facilities
for one of four major health shocks. We obtained Medicare data for
these patients for a period up to eleven years following the shock.
With household survey data, we were able to measure health before
and after the shock. The data also allowed us to identify the hospital
to which the patient was admitted following the shock.
Section 3 describes our data and section 4, our empirical methods.
Section 5 presents our empirical findings; section 6 concludes the
study.6 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
III.Data
The study sample was drawn from the National Long-Term Care
Survey (NLTCS), which is a panel study fielded in 1982, 1984, 1989,
and 1994. Overall, 35,800 Medicare beneficiaries were included in the
database for at least some time. NLTCS drew its sample from Medi-
care enrollment records for persons sixty-five years of age and older.
A screener interview was administered to all 35,800 beneficiaries
Based on responses to the screener, full interviews were conducted
with persons who reported having at least one limitation in activities
of daily living (ADLs) or in instrumental activities of daily living
(IADLs), lasting for three months or longer or expected to last at least
this long.3 Respondents lived in the community or in other facilities,
most notably in nursing homes. The NLTCS collected detailed infor-
mation on functional and cognitive status, health conditions, demo-
graphic characteristics of the family, including potential caregivers,
education, race/ethnicity, and income, including sources of income
and wealth.
NLTCS was merged with data from other sources. First, data on all
Medicare claims, inpatient, outpatient, Part B physician, home health,
skilled nursing facility, and hospice from 1982 through 1995 were
merged with all individuals screened by NLTCS in any year (Manton
et al. 1995; Center for Demographic Studies 1998). Each claim in-
cluded information on diagnoses and amounts billed and paid by
Medicare. Using hospital identifiers on the claim, we could identify
the hospitals, which in turn allowed us to assign ownership codes
using data from the American Hospital Association. Also using AHA
data, we assigned values of the resident-to-bed ratio by hospital and
year as a measure of the intensity of teaching activity at the hospital.
Dates of deaths for all NLTCS respondents were verified from Medi-
care enrollment records, the National Death Index, and state vital
records systems for all NLTCS respondents (Center for Demographic
Studies 1998).
For purposes of this analysis, we selected persons who were ad-
mitted to hospitals for stays of ninety-one days or less, with primary
diagnoses of hip fracture, stroke, coronary heart disease, or con-
gestive heart failure; individuals dying on date of index admission
were included. We selected the first admission for these conditions
that occurred starting in 1984. Since we had Medicare claims data
starting in 1982 and the 1982 NLTCS asked about conditions duringDoes Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? 7
the preceding year, we had a minimum of a three-year look-back
period for ascertaining "first" admissions for a particular condition.
A purpose for limiting the empirical analysis to first shocks was to
reduce the influence of factors affecting outcomes we could not mea-
sure (omitted heterogeneity), such as persons who select a hospital
for a hard-to-treat condition after care at other hospitals failed to
yield desired results.4 For measuring rehospitalization for the same
diagnosis, there had to be at least three days between a discharge
and a subsequent admission. This criterion was selected because pre-
liminary analysis revealed that some Medicare patients were dis-
charged and readmitted to the same hospital on the same day; these
cases likely represented transfers between units within the same hos-
pital, or transfers to other types of facilities to continue care (such as
a rehabilitation hospital).
Our case selection process resulted in a pooled analysis sample
of 2,674 patients who were admitted to 1,378 different hospitals
throughout the United States. Once a case was selected, it was fol-
lowed through the end of 1995 or death, whichever occurred first.
To assess differences in performance by ownership, we classified
hospitals into five mutually exclusive categories. If a hospital had
residents, it was classified as a teaching hospital. Teaching is asso-
ciated with higher cost (Sloan et al. 1983; Garber et al. 1984; lezzoni
et al. 1990) and differences in case mix (Sloan and Valvona 1986). We
defined the facility as minor teaching if the facility had a resident-
to-bed ratio of less than 0.097, which was the median ratio for our
sample. Otherwise, the teaching facility was major. Medicare has
used the ratio of residents per bed as a measure of teaching intensity
for purposes of subsidizing teaching hospitals (Iglehart 1998). In the
vast majority of cases, 86 percent for both minor and major teaching
facilities, the teaching hospital was organized on a private nonprofit
basis. With the exception of a single patient observation, the rest of
the patients admitted to major teaching hospitals were admitted to
government facilities. For minor teaching hospitals, the remaining 14
percent were distributed as 6 percent government and 8 percent for-
profit. Hospitals with no residents were classified as nonteaching
hospitals. We split nonteaching hospitals into these ownership cate-
gories: for-profit, private nonprofit, and public. Patient sample sizes
by category were: for-profit (N = 226), government (N = 416), and
private nonprofit hospitals (N = 1,197), minor teaching (N = 421),
and major teaching hospitals (N = 414).S Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
We investigated differences in the use of invasive cardiology tech-
niques from the date of the index admission through 31 December
1995, among the 877 patients in our sample who were admitted for a
primary diagnosis of coronary heart disease. Because our Medicare
claims data made it difficult to accurately determine whether or not
rehabilitation services were provided to beneficiaries before 1990,
only the period 1991-95 was used to analyze, differences in receipt of
rehabilitation services by hospital type. We drew a sample of all per-
Sons suffering a hip fracture or a stroke from 1 January 1991 to 31
December 1994, whether it was their index (first) event or not. We
allowed for more than one observation for re-fractures and re-strokes
if the subsequent admission occurred at least one year from the first
event we observed from 1991 to 1994. This selection process resulted
in a sample of 486 persons with hip fractures and 533 with strokes.
IV.Empirical Methods
Overview.Our empirical analysis assessed the effect of ownership
on Medicare payments, service intensity, and on quality of care. Our
payment measures included not only the amount paid by Medicare
for the index admission but payments made by Medicare up to six
months following the index admission. On quality of care, we exam-
ined the effect of ownership on mortality.
Dependent Variables.To measure Medicare payments, we specified
two dependent variables: (1) total Medicare payments on behalf of
the beneficiary during the first six months; and (2) total Medicare
payments during the first six months less Medicare payments asso-
ciated with the first hospital stay, including physician Part B
payments for the period of the index admission. All monetarily
expressed variables were converted to 1994 dollars using the Con-
sumer Price Index, all itens.6
We analyzed Medicare payments after the initial hospitalization
for the following reasons. Some hospitals may offer more intensive
care immediately after the health shock occurs (such asthrombolytic
therapy), which produces savings in care. As a result, rehospitaliza-
tion rates may be lower or the probability of being institutionalized
in a nursing home may be lower. Alternatively, hospitals may not
offer higher intensity at the first admission. Rather they may refer
patients to service providers with which they have contractual rela-Does Where You Are Admthed Make a Difference? 9
tionships, thus possibly raising Medicare payments after discharge.
The second possibility is not mutually exclusive with the first, but the
impact on Medicare payments may be the opposite.
We constructed a sample to describe monthly payments after the
initial admission for those patients who were discharged alive from
the hospital the first time they were hospitalized after the shock
(2,443 of 2,674). The six-month follow-up period began with the day
of index admission and ended six months later, and was identical to
the period used for total payments. We included all Medicare pay-
ments with one exception. We did not include hospice payments,
since virtually no patients in our sample had hospice claims.
We measured the probability of being discharged dead from the
index admission; and for beneficiaries discharged alive from the index
admission, we measured time to death. Although the data identified
dates of death, for computational reasons, we converted the data into
weeks. In our sample, 1,924 (72%) died during the study period
(through 31 December 1995); 231 (9%) died during the index admis-
sion, and 1,693 (63%) died subsequently.
Differences of means for the receipt of cardiac catheterization,
angioplasty, and coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery sub-
sequent to an index admission were compared for persons with a
primary diagnosis of coronary heart disease. We analyzed the proba-
bility of receipt of cardiac catheterization (N = 245, 28%) and receipt
of angioplasty or CABG surgery (N = 147, 17%), taking into account
the fact that some beneficiaries died before they could receive the
procedure.
We analyzed the probability of receipt of rehabilitation within one
year of an admission for a hip fracture (394 of 486, 81%), and after a
stroke (360 of 533, 68%).
Ownership and Teaching Status.Our analysis focused on the role of
ownership and teaching status of the hospital to which the benefi-
ciary was first admitted. We used the five categories described
above, with for-profit, nonteaching hospitals, the omitted reference
group.
Other Explanatory Variables.Other explanatory variables fell into
four categories: demographic/income, health preshock, primary diag-
nosis at index admission, and other. These variables are described
in table 1.1.10 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
Table 1.1
Explanatory variables used in multivariate models
Ownership/teaching
Government Nonteaching government hospital in the year
of index admission
Nonprofit Nonteaching nonprofit hospital in the year of
index admission
Minor teaching Teaching hospital with some, but less than
0.097 residents-per-bed set up and staffed in
the year of index admission
Major teaching Teaching hospital with 0.097 or more
residents-per-bed set up and staffed in the year
of index admission
For-profit Nonteaching for-profit hospital in the year of
index admission is the omitted category
Demographic/income
Age Age on date of index admission, years
Male Male gender
Education Years of education, at NLTCS interview before
index admission
White White race, black, and other omitted
Married Married, at NLTCS interview before index
admission
Income (thousands) Total family income, at NLTCS interview
before index admission
Health, preshock
Lived in community Lived in the community, at NLTCS interview
before index admission
No. ADL limitations Number of limitations in Activities at Daily
Living, at NLTCS interview before index
admission (eating, getting in/out of bed,
moving around inside, dressing, bathing,
using a toilet, max of six)
Cognitively aware Answered seven or more questions correctly
from the Short Portable Mental Status
Questionnaire, at NLTCS interview before
index admission (Pfeiffer 1975)
Lack bladder/bowel control Reported losing control of bladder or bowels,
at NLTCS interview before index admission




DXCG concurrent risk model, calculated using
ICD-9CM codes other than primary
diagnosis, measured at index admission
(DXCG 1996; Ellis 1996)
Hemorrhagic stroke










Population sq. mile (000)
NLTCS year
New cohort
Other hip fracture (pertrochanteric fracture is
omitted disease type)
Uncomplicated congestive heart failure
Congestive heart failure with hypertension/
renal disease
Acute myocardial infarction
Unstable angina or angina pectoris
Ischemic heart disease
Year of index admission, equal to 1 in 1984 to
11 in 1994
Population per square mile in the resident's
Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) in year of index
admission (conurbations of counties for
metropolitan areas, single counties in
nonmetropolitan areas). PSUs were defined for
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSAs) for persons in metropolitan areas and
counties for persons living in nonmetropolitan
areas. There were 173 PSUs in 42 states
Year of NLTCS used for variables measured
before index admission (1984 = 1, 1989 = 2,
1994 = 3)
Person who first answered the NLTCS
interview in 1989 or 1994
Estimation.For the payment analysis, we ranked beneficiaries in
descending order according to how much Medicare spent on their be-
half. We then split the sample into fifths. We then used ordered logit
analysis to determine why beneficiaries fell into specific quintiles.7
We estimated a logistic regression model to estimate the probabil-
ity of being discharged dead from the index admission. We used a
Cox proportional hazard model with one outcome (death) from time
of being discharged alive to 31 December 1995. Logistic regression
was used to estimate the probability of receiving a heart catheter-
ization procedure, and a competing risks model was estimated using
a Cox proportional hazards model for two outcomes, death and
receipt of angioplasty or coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) sur-
gery for the 877 cases with a diagnosis of coronary heart disease.
Logistic regression was used to estimate the probability of receipt of
rehabilitation.12 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
Table 1.2
Medicare payments within six months
Note: Rows may not sum exactly due to rounding. N = 2,674 for total table.
ap <0.01; bp <0.05; Cp <0.10 for t-test (2 tailed) of mean Medicare payments.
All t-tests are comparisons with for-profit hospitals.
V.Results
Medicare Payments
On average, Medicare spent $11,680 (1994$) in total during the first
six months following the index admission date (table 1.2). Of this,
only three-fifths of the total, including payments to hospitals and
physicians for care in the hospital, was spent on the index admission.
Among the five ownership-teaching status categories, Medicare
spent the least on patients admitted to government hospitals ($8,869)
and the most on patients admitted to major teaching facilities
($14,870). Spending on patients admitted to for-profit and private
nonteaching, nonprofit hospitals was very similar$11,657 versus
$11,435. The difference in Medicare payments after the index admis-
sion among these ownership forms was somewhat greater; spending
on the index admission accounted for 58 percent of the total for-profit
but 60 percent for the nonprofits. On average, 8 percent of Medicare
payments for the index admission went for either physician Part B or
for outpatient care (not shown in table). This percentage varied only
little among the five hospital categories.
Overall, for Medicare payments after the index admission, most
payments during the first six months went for rehospitalization
(53%), followed in descending order by Part B physician and out-
patient (23%), skilled nursing facility (14%), and home health (10%)
(table 1.3). Compared to the other hospital types, such payments
were relatively high for patients initially hospitalized in for-profit
facilities for Part B physician/outpatient and home care. Such pay-
Ownership! Index Post-index Total six
teaching admission admission months
For-profit 6,742 4,915 11,657
Government 5,167a 3,704a 8,869a
Nonprofit 6,893 4,542 11,435
Minor teaching 7,661' 4,369 12,030
Major teaching 8,729a 6,142a 14,870a
Total 7,017 4,664 11,680Does Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? 13
ments were slightly below average for skilled nursing care and
rehospitalization.
The time path of payments after discharge from the initial hospital
stay also differed by ownership and teaching status (table 1.3). Con-
sidering patients discharged from the index stay alive, for for-profit
patients, Medicare paid $1,275 for the rest of the first month on aver-
age, and $1,498 for the second month. By month six, for the 89 per-
cent of patients who were still alive of those discharged from the
index stay alive, payments were $706 on average. Compared to the
other types of hospitals, patients admitted to for-profits incurred
much higher expenses for the rest of the first month. Month two's
payments for for-profits were similar to those for nonteaching non-
profits and for major teaching hospitals, but greater than for hospi-
tals in the remaining categories, especially nonteaching public and
minor teaching facilities. By month six, these differentials were much
smaller.
Nonteaching public hospitals were the low-cost outlier, measured
in terms of payments to Medicare. Patients admitted to such facilities
evidently received much less care immediately after the index stay,
possibly because they more often lacked a regular physician.
Holding other determinants of cost in ordered logit analysis
constant, total Medicare payments on behalf of patients admitted to
government facilities were lower, and such payments on behalf of
patients admitted to major teaching hospitals were higher than those
for the omitted reference group, for-profit hospitals (table 1.4). On
average, payments for nonprofit patients tended to be lower and
those for minor teaching hospitals higher, but these differences had
high associated standard errors. Based on the parameter estimates,
the probability of total Medicare payments being in the highest fifth
of such payments was 0.08 lower for government than for for-profit
facilities. Corresponding differences between the other hospital own-
ership categories and for-profit hospitals were: 0.01 for nonprofits;
0.01 for minor teaching; and 0.06 for major teaching hospitals. Given
our specification, probabilities of being in the lowest quintile (not
shown) were almost the same in absolute value as those for the top
quintile. Without the covariates described in table 1.1 (not included
in table 1.4), differences between probabilities of total payments being
in the top quintile relative to for-profits were generally somewhat
higher in absolute value: 0.07 for government; 0.00 for nonprofit;
0.04 for minor teaching; and 0.11 for major teaching hospitals.14 Sloan, Picorie, Taylor, and Chou
Table 1.3
Medicare payments post-index admission (persons discharged alive from index
admission)
Note: Total payments following the index admission calculated using only those per-
sons who were discharged alive from the index admission (N = 2,443). Only persons
surviving to the first day of a month were included in the denominator for each month.
ap <0.01; bp <0.05; Cp <0.10 for t-test (2 tailed) of mean Medicare payments. All






1 2 3 4 5 6
Total
For-profit 5,290 1,275 1,498 819 595 695 706
Government 4,163c 528a 903a 898 770 789 590
Nonprofit 4,965 821c 1,400 934 783 791 504
Minor teaching 4,765 851 1,063c 1,050 822 554 705
Major teaching 6,656c 968 1,495 1,519 1,041b954 936
Total 5,104 844 1,295 1,031 813 771 635
Ambulatory (part B and outpatient)
For-profit 1,386 412 267 200 170 208 210
Government 947b lSlb 197 182 179 184 127
Nonprofit 1,111 214c 241 228 198 159 134
Minor teaching 1,215 186b 250 242 159 208 248
Major teaching 1,469 265 312 3l0' 237 184 217
Total 1,182 225 249 234 193 178 171
Home health
For-profit 718 73 200 212 105 102 74
Government 518 22a 140 137a 123 73 63
Nonprofit 506c 53 132 l27b 84 74 67
Minor teaching 420b 48 141 101 71 47c 34C
Major teaching 477 51 155 134 63 50c 39
Total 508 49 144 133 87 68 57
Skilled nursing facility
For-profit 648 141 285 164 65 3 16
Government 497 98 191 107 75 34c 18
Nonprofit 750 195 303 129 50 78a 23
Minor teaching 693 149 268 145 88 49c 24
Major teaching 748 169 275 137 117 21c 48
Total 694 164 275 132 72 51 26
Rehospitalization
For-profit 2,537 649 746 243 256 382 404
Government 2,198 258b 375b 472b 393 497 381
Nonprofit 2,597 360 725 450 451C 481 281
Minor teaching 2,437 469 404c 562a 504 250 399
Major teaching 3,963a 481 753 939a 64b 698 633
Total 2,720 406 628 532 462 474 381Does Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? 15
Table 1.4
Ordered logit analysis of total payments and total less index payments
Note: Coeff. is coefficient, standard errors are in parentheses, marginal effects, shown
in brackets, are for the probability of a patient being in the top 20 percent of total six-
month Medicare payments and Medicare payments after the index admission. We also
included the covariates listed in table 1.1 as explanatory variables. These results were
not included in the table to permit focus on the variables of major interest.
ap <0.01; bp <0.05; 'p <0.10.
Excluding total payments for index admission, payments on behalf
of patients admitted to for-profit hospitals tended to be relatively
high. The probability of being in the top quintile in the distribution of
payments made by Medicare on behalf of beneficiaries was 0.04
higher for for-profits than for nonprofit hospitals. The exception was
major teaching hospitals. Holding other factors constant, the proba-
bility of being in the top quintile of payments made after the index
stay was identical for patients admitted to for-profit and major
teaching hospitals.
Intensity of Treatment
For the 877 patients admitted for one of the three coronary heart dis-
ease (CHD) diagnoses, 27.9 percent received a cardiac catherization,
5.1 percent an angioplasty, and 13.3 percent coronary bypass surgery
(CABG) at some time after the date of index admission (table 1.5). In
the event that the patients received both, the patient was classified
under the type of therapeutic procedure (angioplasty or CABG) that
occurred first.
Compared to the overall mean of the sample, CHD patients ini-
tially admitted to for-profit facilities were less likely to have received
a cardiac catherization and an angioplasty but more likely to have
had CABG. Patients admitted to public facilities were much less likely
Explanatory variables
Medicare payments
Total first six months Total less index first six months
Coeff. (s.e.)[me.] Coeff. (s.e.) [m.e.]
Government ..0.56a(0.15)[-0.081_032b (0.16)[-0.05]
Nonprofit 0.10 (0.13)[-0.011_0.24c (0.14) [-0.041
Minor teaching 0.10 (0.15) [0.0110.25 (0.16) [-0.041
Major teaching 0.41a(0.15) [0.06]0.00070 (0.16) [-0.00]
N 2,674 2,44316 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
Table 1.5
Use of invasive techniques after index admission for coronary heart disease, by hospi-
tal type
Patients receiving given procedure (%)
Ownership! Heart Coronary artery
teaching N catheterizationAngioplastybypass graft
Receipt of procedure measured from index admission to 31 December 1995.
ap <0.01; bp <0.05; :p <0i0 for t-test (2 tailed) of mean value of percent of patients
receiving procedure by hospital type. All t-tests are comparisons with for-profit
hospitals.
to have received cardiac catherization or bypass surgery. Rates for all
three types of procedures were relatively high for teaching hospitals.
Logit analysis of the probability of cardiac catherization that took
account of other covariates confirms the descriptive findings (table
1.6). The probability of having this procedure was 0.07 lower for
patients admitted to government facilities than for those admitted to
for-profit facilities. The probability for CHD patients admitted to
major teaching hospitals was 0.11 higher.
Holding other determinants constant, patients with stroke who
were initially admitted to for-profit facilities were more likely to have
received rehabilitation (table 1.7). The differences from the omitted
reference groups for-profit facilities were statistically significant for
teaching hospitals but not for nonteaching hospitals. Interestingly, in
this respect, treatment was more intensive for patients initially ad-
mitted to nonteaching than to teaching hospitals. We found no dif-
ference by hospital ownership or teaching status in the probability
of receiving rehabilitation after hip fracture.
In sum, patients admitted to for-profit hospitals were no more
likely than other patients to have received intensive treatment for
CHD with the exception of those admitted to nonteaching gov-
ernment hospitals. On rehabilitation, patients at such hospitals were
not treated differently from patients at other types of nonteaching
hospitals.
For-profit 72 23.6 2.8 15.3
Government 137 17.5 3.6 58b
Nonprofit 367 26.7 5.4 12.5
Minor teaching 151 32.4 5.3 17.2
Major teaching 150 38.0k' 6.7 17.3
All 877 27.9 5.1 13.3Does Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? 117
Table 1.6
Probability of receiving cardiac catheterization and time to invasive cardiac procedures
following CHD index admission
Note: Coeff. is coefficient, standard errors are in parentheses, marginal effects, shown
in brackets, are for the probability of a patient's receiving cardiac catheterization. We
also included the covariates listed in table 1.1 as explanatory variables. The hazard
model for time to angioplasty or coronary artery bypass graft surgery controlled for
death using competing risks.
ap <0.01; bp <0.05; Cp < 0.10.
Table 1.7
Probability of receiving rehabilitation within one year of index admission
Note: Coeff. is coefficient, standard errors are in parentheses, marginal effects, shown
in brackets, are for the probability of a patient receiving rehabilitation within one year
of index admission. We also included the covariates listed in table 1.1 as explanatory
variables.







variables Coeff. (se.) [m.e.] Coeff. (s.e.)
Government -0.39 (0.40) [-0.07] _0.73c (0.43)
Nonprofit 0.086 (0.34) [0.01] -0.089 (0.32)
Minor teaching 0.33 (0.38) [0.05] -0.099 (0.36)
Major teaching 0.67c (0.38) [0.11] 0.17 (0.34)
N 877 877
N receiving 245 147
Explanatory variables
Stroke Hip fracture
Coeff. (s.e.) [m.e.] Coeff. (s.e.) [me.]
Government -0.49 (0.34)[-0.10]-0.49 (0.47)[-0.06]
Nonprofit -0.44 (0.29) [-0.09] -0.31 (0.35)[-0.04]
Minor teaching -0.91" (0.40) [-0.19]-0.55 (0.52)[-0.07]
Major teaching -0.69' (0.41) [-0.15] 1.01 (0.71) [0.12]
N 533 486
N receiving 360 394Note: Rows may not sum exactly to 100 percent due to rounding. Cells show percent
of patients who were initially admitted to a particular hospital type, by readmission
status. Died means that the patient died before being readmitted. Censored means
the patient had not been readmitted as of 31 December 1995, regardless of when the
initital index admission occurred. Readmission is for the same primary diagnosis.
The minimum follow-up time was one year for patients with index admissions on 31
December 1994.
ap <0.01; bp <0.05; cp <0.10 for t-test (2 tailed) of percent readmitted, died, and cen-
sored. All t-tests are comparisons with for-profit hospitals. No differences were sig-
nificantly different.
Readmission Patterns
Overall, 66.4 percent of patients who were discharged alive were
readmitted for the same primary diagnosis at some time before the
end of 1995 (table 1.8). Almost a quarter of the patients died before
they could be readmitted (24.1%). Only a tenth (9.5%) were alive
on 31 December 1995, and had not been readmitted by that date
("censored" observations).
Differences among the ownership-teaching status types were rela-
tively minor, and none of the differences were statistically significant
at conventional levels. Readmission rates ranged from 64.8 percent for
nonprofit to 70.1 percent for major teaching hospitals. The patients
initially admitted to nonteaching government facilities were least
likely to have reached the end of our time series (13 December 1995)
without being readmitted for the same diagnosis as at the index
admission (6.7%) (were least likely to be censored).
Overall, 18.3 percent were readmitted to a different hospital than
their choice for the index stay. Patients admitted to government
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Readmitted Not readmitted
Ownership! Same Different
teaching hospital hospital Died Censored N
For-profit 48.7 18.6 24.3 8.4 226
Government 51.2 15.9 26.2 6.7 416
Nonprofit 47.8 17.0 24.3 10.9 1,197
Minor teaching 45.4 21.4 25.9 7.6 421
Major teaching 48.6 21.5 19.1 10.9 414
All 48.1 18.3 24.1 9.5 2,674Does Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? 19
Table 1.9
Probability of being discharged dead from index admission and survival conditional
upon being discharged alive from index admission
Note: Coeff. is coefficient, standard errors are in parentheses, marginal effects, shown
in brackets, are for the probability of a patient being discharged dead from the
index admission. Mortality was followed from the date of discharge alive through
31 December 1995. We also included the covariates listed in table 1.1 as explanatory
variables.
ap <0.01; bp <0.05; Cp <0.10.
controlling for deaths, for-profit hospital patients were least likely to
switch. By contrast, patients initially admitted to teaching hospitals
were most likely to switch. Interpreting readmission as a measure of
quality (admittedly an imperfect measure), for-profit hospitals fared
well in this regard.
Survival
Although the parameter estimates were uniformly positive, suggest-
ing lower discharge mortality for those admitted to for-profit facili-
ties, none of the parameter estimates in the analysis of the probability
of being discharged dead from the index admission were statistically
significant at conventional levels (table 1.9).
For those who survived the index stay, life expectancy was higher
for patients initially admitted to major teaching hospitals than for
those admitted to for-profits. Although the parameter estimates on
the other variables had the same sign as the binary variable for major
teaching facilities showing better survival relative to for-profits, none
was statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, on this







variables Coeff. (s.e.) [me.] Coeff. (s.e.)
Government 0.52 (0.32) [0.02] 0.12 (0.10)
Nonprofit 0.21 (0.30) [0.011 0.14 (0.090)
Minor teaching 0.12 (0.33) [0.011 0.13 (0.10)
Major teaching 0.0011 (0.34) [0.00] .0.32a (0.11)
N 2674 2,443
N Dead 231 1,69320 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
VI.Discussion
The choice of ownership form is an important matter for public policy.
For one, governments confer certain tax advantages on nonprofits.
Offsetting these advantages is the inability of nonprofits to raise capi-
tal by selling an ownership interest to investors. An important policy
question is whether society receives value for the tax subsidies it
grants nonprofits.
Various public agencies are involved in deciding whether a hospital
with particular characteristics should be allowed to enter the market.
For several decades, state certificate of need agencies have had the
authority to allow or disallow hospital entry. In recent years, state
attorneys general have begun to assert their supervisory authority
over disposition of assets by public charities, including hospitals
desiring to switch from nonprofit to for-profit ownership. Decisions
by public agencies are often made in an adversarial process without
much reference to the empirical evidence about how ownership
affects behavior. Interestingly, the federal government has not been
involved in hospital ownership-related issues. Such programs as
Medicare and Medicaid, however, do have the power to bar a hospi-
tal from receiving payment if there is a determination of substandard
quality of care or fraud. This power is rarely exercised, and when
exercised, public agencies may expect considerable opposition from
the affected hospital and its constituency. Results of our research
suggest that Medicare has a definite financial interest in where Medi-
care beneficiaries are admitted for their hospital care.
The answer to the question posed by this chapter's title is "yes,
choice of hospital does matter." Along one dimension, hospital own-
ership, two differences are noteworthy as is one lack of difference.
The two noteworthy differences pertain to (1) the lower total Medi-
care expenditures on behalf of patients admitted to government facili-
ties, and (2) the higher expenditures on behalf of patients admitted to
for-profit facilities post discharge, especially during the first two
months following hospitalization. A third difference, lower survival
for patients initially admitted to government facilities, appeared in
the descriptive statistics, but did not withstand the addition of other
covariates in the multivariate analysis.
The noteworthy nondifference is the high degree of similarity be-
tween for-profit and private nonprofit nonteaching hospitals other
than on Medicare payments. Above, we reported results on survivalDoes Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? 21
that showed no differences among nonteaching hospitals. In other
analyses not reported in this chapter, we studied other measures
of health outcomes including activities of daily living, instrumental
activities of daily living, being in a nursing home versus the commu-
nity, and cognitive status. For all of these measures, patients initially
admitted to major teaching hospitals had the same or better outcomes.
As with this analysis, there was no difference between nonteaching
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (Sloan et al. 1998; Taylor et al. 1998).
The higher levels of Medicare spending on for-profit hospital
patients for physicians' services and home health compared to non-
profit hospital patients may reflect greater vertical integration in for-
profit facilities, both contractual and informal. Criteria for referrals
after hospital discharge are not well developed. In the absence of firm
clinical criteria, financial incentives may dictate choices (Potthoff et al.
1997). Examples of vertical integration in this context are a hospital
owning a home health facility or having informal understandings
with medical staff about referrals. Higher expenditures for such care
may be a manifestation of such integration. More probing is needed
to determine whether in fact for-profit facilities are more tightly inte-
grated on average. To understand the informal contractual relation-
ships (or informal arrangements), it will be necessary to conduct
in-depth case studies of a few hospitals.
We found that patient survival was better in major teaching facili-
ties, with and without controls for other influences. Medicare
payments were higher. But controlling for other factors, Medicare
payments subsequent to the discharge from the index hospital were
about the same as for for-profit hospitals and higher on average than
for the other hospital types. Major teaching hospitals received higher
levels of subsidies from Medicare for disproportionate share and for
medical education. We did not eliminate these subsidies from our cal-
culations. However, if one did, some differences in Medicare spending
would still remain.
Several studies have compared cost by hospital ownership and
teaching status. Fewer have compared quality of hospital care. The
most rigorous large-scale empirical study of quality that permits
comparisons by hospital ownership and teaching status is by Keeler
et al. (1992). The authors found no difference in quality between
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals on two quality indicators, whereas
public hospitals fared worse on both criteria. However, on a third
measure, there was a statistically significant difference between qual-22 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
ity of care of nonprofit hospitals and that of for-profit and public
hospitals favorable to nonprofits. Keeler et al. appear to have been
more persuaded by the results of the first two indicators. They con-
cluded that "nonprofit and for-profit hospitals provide similar care
overall" (p. 1712). Hartz et al. (1989) found that mortality was higher
in for-profit than in nonprofit hospitals, but they used fewer co-
variates than we. Shortell and Hughes (1988) found no difference in
quality of care by ownership. On structural measures of quality, such
as percentage of hospitals with Joint Commission of Hospitals Ac-
creditation and percentage of hospitals with intensive care units, the
two organizational forms are quite similar (Herzlinger and Krasker
1987).
Compared to previous studies, the most important innovations of
our research are its longitudinal feature, inclusion of Medicare pay-
ments after the index admission, direct measures of intensity of care,
and a much larger number of controls for other determinants of pay-
ments and patterns of care. Also, in our analysis, we studied several
adverse health events that are common among elderly persons.
With the longitudinal data, we were able to track outcomes for up
to eleven years. We limited our analysis of Medicare payments to the
first six months following the index admission. We could have fol-
lowed such payments for longer time spans. However, much of the
expenditure is incurred during the first six months.8
Generally, the number of variables available for inclusion falls
as the database becomes more nationally representative and covers
a longer historical period. In this study, we were able toinclude
a comparatively large number of demographicvariables, including
educational attainment, family income, health and functional status,
and living arrangements before the adverse health event occurred. By
contrast, with Medicare claims data or hospital discharge abstracts,
the researcher has only very limited information on the patient, such
as age, race, gender, and, if provided, geographic location. Thus,
although there may have been some omissions of more subtle patient
characteristics and on severity of the health shock, we did control for
many of the important variables.
We analyzed four major conditions affecting large numbers of
elderly. For three of the conditions, admission is likely to be largely
unanticipated and sudden. For the fourth, congestive heart failure
(CHF), admission typically represents a serious exacerbation of a
condition for which the patient sought care previously. AlthoughDoes Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? 23
admission for these conditions represens only a small proportion of
all hospital admissions by the elderly, often data limitations compel
the researcher to generalize based on one condition.
Finally, patient selection of hospital may be endogenous. Although
patients are likely to be limited in their ability to select a hospital
given an unanticipated health shock of the kinds included in our
study, for-profit hospitals may be more likely to locate where demand
for hospital care is high (Norton and Staiger 1994). Possibly patients
with more serious and complex conditions were admitted to high
input hospitals. In research we conducted with hospital choice as
endogenous (Sloan et al. 1998), we found statistically significant dif-
ferences in Medicare payments between for-profit and government
facilities, as reported here, and between for-profit and nonprofit
facilities. The "notable nondifference" in this chapter would become
a "notable difference." The estimates presented here, if anything, on
higher payments for for-profits are conservative.
Notes
The research was supported in part by a grant from the National Institute on Aging to
Duke University (2R01-AG-09468-04A1).
In tenns of average daily patient census adjusted for outpatient output, shares in
1996 were: 71 percent private nonprofit; 10 percent for-profit, and 18 percent govern-
ment (American Hospital Association 1998).
See, for example, Eichenwald (1997).
The ADLs were using help eating, getting in or out of bed, moving around inside,
dressing, bathing, and using the toilet (maximum of six). The IADLs were using help in
less personal ways, such as doing housework and preparing meals (maximum of six).
Evidence on hospital switching at readmission to a hospital for the same diagnosis
is presented below.
In terms of ownership shares the split by ownership in our sample is almost identi-
cal to the national distribution of average daily hospital census in the mid 1990s. See
note 1.
In some cases, negative Medicare payments were shown. These appeared to be cor-
rections of previous billing errors as they were identical in absolute magnitude to a
positive Medicare payment item in the same record. These cases were balanced to zero.
This specification was used because of the strong right-skewedness of distribution
of Medicare payments and because preliminary analysis suggested a problem with
heteroscedasticity, when the dependent variable was in log form, making interpreta-
tion 6f the effect of covariates on the dependent variable difficult. On this issue, see
Manning (1998). The upper bounds for the total payment dependent variable were
$4,126, $6,687, $10,708, $17,335, and $102,534. For total payments less index payments,24 Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
the upper bounds were $142, $975, $3,355, $8,623, and $72,413. There was a substantial
range in payments in the top quintiles.
8. We found this in calculations not presented. For the time path of Medicare pay-
ments for stroke using a much larger Medicare sample but with fewer explanatory
variables and patient characteristics, see Lipscomb et al. (1998).
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